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Urban water managers need to adopt water demand management (WDM) as one of the ways to provide for the
needs and demands of escalating urban populations, amidst the negative impacts of increased pollution loads and
climate change on finite water resources. This paper reviews how urban water tariff structures could be designed to
promote water conservation in households while also ensuring revenue sufficiency for the service providers and
affordability for low-income households. As an example, the paper describes the case of Zaragoza (Spain), a city
where implementation of a water-conserving tariff and providing economic incentives largely contributed to a 27%
reduction in overall water consumption between 1996 and 2008, although the population of the city increased by
12%. Similar principles were adapted to model a water-saving, socially equitable tariff for the city of Kampala
(Uganda). The proposed tariff for Kampala can save over 2.5 million m3 of water and generate an extra
US$ 0.68 million of revenue per year, which could be used to extend water services to currently unserved households
in low-income settlements. If implemented, the tariff could enhance economic efficiency, revenue sufficiency, social
equity and service coverage.
1. Introduction
The world’s population is escalating amidst fixed water resources.
UN-Habitat projects the world’s population to increase from about
6.9 billion in 2010, to 8.3 billion in 2030, with most of the
growth in less developed regions. In the past three decades, the
world has witnessed phenomenal urbanisation rates, with over
half of the world’s population living in towns and cities since
2008. Developing countries will experience higher demographic
challenges, where it is estimated that the urban population will
increase from 2.57 billion in 2010 to 3.95 billion by 2030,
representing 94% of the global urban population growth (UN-
Habitat, 2009). The combined effects of rapid urban growth and
the predicted increase in negative impacts of climate change will
inevitably result in a huge decrease in per capita water availability
in urban areas of developing countries (Stern, 2007).
This looming water scarcity, coupled with widespread environ-
mental degradation, has brought into focus the need for planned
action to manage water resources in a more effective way. The
existing challenges cannot be overcome through conventional
urban water management principles, which are usually over-
dependent on supply planning. Increasingly, there is need for
urban water managers and planners to adopt an integrated
resource planning (IRP) approach. IRP is the process of carrying
out a comprehensive analysis of both demand-side and supply-
side options, using a common set of criteria, in order to deduce
least-cost options for satisfying increasing demand (White and
Fane, 2001). Demand management, an important component of
IRP, may be defined as the development and implementation of
strategies, policies, measures or other initiatives aimed at influ-
encing demand so as to achieve efficient and sustainable use of a
scarce resource (Savenije and van der Zaag, 2002).
Water demand management (WDM) involves the adoption of
policies and investment by a water utility to achieve efficient
water use both within the water distribution network and on the
customers’ side (Kayaga, 2011). Measures in the distribution
network include
j reduction in system losses, including timely leakage detection
and repair
j efficient operational procedures such as optimum operating
pressure and reduced mains flushing or reservoir cleaning
j control of street water points
j institutional capacity building in the utility to raise the
importance of WDM measures
j ensuring accountability of staff of the water utility (Kayaga,
2011; Turner et al., 2006; White and Fane, 2001).
As part of WDM measures, a water utility could also introduce
universal customer metering to
j encourage economic usage of water
j maintain efficient and informative billing systems
j design and enforce water tariffs that encourage water
conservation in customers’ properties
j provide comprehensive information, education, training and
advisory services to customers who wish to take action to
reduce their water use
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j provide detailed water use analysis (audits) for water
consumers in the various sectors
j provide financial incentives for the purchase and installation
of efficient water using equipment in customers’ premises
(Kayaga, 2011; Turner et al., 2006).
For water conservation to be sustainable, utilities need to tap
into the conservation potential from both behavioural and
technical categories and use a combination of measures and
instruments that will achieve the optimum changes. Measures
are actions to be taken – the conversion of inefficient to
efficient flush toilets, for example. Instruments are how to
ensure the chosen measures are taken up by the customers, for
example through public education, advertising and marketing.
Instruments may be economic, regulatory or communicative
(Turner et al., 2006).
This paper focuses on how economic instruments can be used to
manage water demand in end-users’ premises. Economic instru-
ments may be defined as ‘. . .the use of market-based signals to
motivate desired types of decision-making. They either provide
financial rewards for desired behaviour or impose costs for
undesirable behaviour’ (Cantin et al., 2005). Economic instru-
ments use market-based signals to motivate desired types of
decision-making, which may be in form of financial incentives or
imposition of costs for undesirable behaviour, mainly through
tariff structures (Kayaga, 2011; Turner et al., 2006).
The remainder of this paper is based on a study into the use of
tariff structures and financial incentives for WDM. The study was
carried out as part of an integrated research project funded by the
European Union (EU), whose overall objective was to apply
integrated water resources management concepts for the achieve-
ment of effective and sustainable urban water schemes in the
‘city of the future (i.e. projected 30–50 years from now)’. The
5-year Switch (Sustainable Water management Improves Tomor-
row’s City Health) project aimed at developing efficient and
interactive urban water systems and services in the city’s
geographical and ecological setting, which are robust, flexible
and responsive to a range of global change pressures.
The next section briefly discusses the use of tariff structures for
WDM. Section 3 details how tariffs and financial incentives have
contributed to a successful integrated programme for enhancing a
water-saving culture in the city of Zaragoza, Spain. Results of a
model developed for applying an example of a water-conserving
tariff in the city of Kampala, Uganda, are reported in Section 4
and conclusions are presented in Section 5.
2. Using tariff structures for WDM
2.1 Objectives for setting water tariffs
A tariff structure may be defined as a set of rules and procedures
used to determine how to charge different categories of con-
sumers. A tariff structure is an important management tool that
j determines the level and pattern of revenue
j contributes to the ability of the service provider to attract
capital
j creates incentives with respect to the production and use of
water services
j influences the total cost of production and value of the
service delivered
j allocates costs among customers, groups of customers, and
over time (Whittington and Boland, 2001).
The form of tariff structure will vary, depending on the objec-
tive(s) of the service provider. There are five main objectives that
may be considered in the design of a water tariff (Barbera´n and
Arbue´s, 2009; Whittington, 2003).
j Cost recovery or revenue sufficiency. The service provider
needs to collect enough revenue that will cover operation and
maintenance costs, cover repayment of loans to replace/
expand infrastructural assets, provide a return on capital
employed and maintain a cash reserve for unforeseen
circumstances.
j Equity. The allocation of costs among consumers should be
proportional to obtained benefits. That is, consumers
receiving the same benefits should pay the same costs
(horizontal equity) and those receiving different benefits
should pay different costs (vertical equity).
j Economic efficiency. Set prices send signals to consumers
that encourage efficient use of the water resource.
j Poverty alleviation or affordability for the poor. The tariff
structure should take consideration of poor communities and
ensure that all households can afford basic water services for
public health. This is an important factor for water utilities in
developing countries.
j Simplicity. The tariff structure should be easily understood by
customers. It should also be simple to administer and enforce
on the part of the service provider.
Other objectives cited in the literature are fairness, public
acceptability, political acceptability, enhancement of credit rating
and net revenue stability. It is difficult to consider all the
objectives in the design of a water tariff because some are
conflicting and some are difficult to quantify (Barbera´n and
Arbue´s, 2009). Hence there is no consensus on the best set of
criteria for tariff design and, in practice, service providers empha-
sise different objectives. This divergence is fuelled by inadequate
empirical data on what really works, partly due to the mono-
polistic nature of the provision of water services (Whittington,
2003).
2.2 Reconciling economic efficiency and cost recovery
objectives
The use of tariffs for managing water demand is based on the
assumption that demand for water to some extent follows similar
trends as other goods in the market: that is, prices guide the
choice of how much to produce and how much to consume, and
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serve to balance supply and demand. According to standard
economic theory, in the absence of externalities in the market,
prices of goods should be set at marginal cost. The marginal cost
is the cost of producing an additional unit of a good or service at
each level of production, and is represented by the price at which
the marginal cost curve intersects with the demand curve. Such a
price is said to be economically efficient since it signals to buyers
the financial and other costs they impose on society as a result of
the consumption of the goods/services, and also ensures that
buyers obtain the largest possible aggregate of benefits at the
given cost (Barbera´n and Arbue´s, 2009).
Water services and other networked utilities are subject to many
important externalities and do not entirely portray characteristics
of pure market goods/services. They possess ‘unique’ character-
istics that need to be considered while applying the marginal cost
pricing theory. First, water supply services and other networked
utilities are characterised by substantial fixed costs and economies
of scale. Hence, in the short term, when there is adequate
infrastructure capacity for the foreseeable future, marginal costs
are typically substantially lower than average costs, and so tariffs
based on short-run marginal costs alone would not ensure full
cost recovery. Second, short-run marginal costs are usually
unstable – for a fixed capacity, the marginal cost will increase in
peak load periods, in unison with the shifting demand curve, as
shown in Figures 1 and 2 (MJA, 2004).
Figure 1 shows the relationship between demand and average cost
and marginal cost curves when the water supply infrastructure
has spare capacity, shortly after it has been constructed. In the
short term, capital costs do not vary and so marginal cost (PM)
includes only the variable cost of water supply. However, as the
spare capacity of the water supply system is exhausted, effective
demand for the water services increases and, during peak demand
times, results in the demand curve shifting to the right, raising
the marginal cost (Figure 2). Under these conditions, if the price
is set at the marginal cost, PM will be higher than the average
cost and the revenue generated will be higher than full cost
recovery. Hence, marginal costs are usually unstable during the
short run and are difficult to estimate (MJA, 2004).
As urban populations grow, demand soon outstrips the capacity
of the infrastructure, and utilities then need to plan for infrastruc-
ture extension, usually requiring the exploitation of new water
resources. Typically, the inputs into the proceeding water supply
project will be at higher costs than the previous project. The
long-run marginal cost represents the marginal cost of capacity
expansion over the long term and is always higher than the short-
run marginal cost. Recognition of the instability associated with
short-run marginal costs has led to the preference of the long-run
marginal cost method over the former. Nonetheless, there are
choices to make on an appropriate planning horizon, in con-
sideration of the fact that infrastructure investments in the water
sector tend to be lumpy, longer term and may require building-in
of substantial spare capacity. Another important consideration is
the selection of a practical method for estimating long-run
marginal costs that is easy to understand/explain and produces
stable price schedules. One of the most commonly used methods
for estimating long-run marginal costs in the water sector is the
average incremental cost (AIC) methodology (Cantin et al., 2005;
MJA, 2004; Whittington, 2003).
Economic efficiency is an important factor in the design of water
tariffs. However, as shown in Figure 1, setting the price of water
services at marginal cost price may not result in full cost
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Figure 1. Cost curves of a fixed-capacity water supply system
when there is spare capacity
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Figure 2. Cost curves for a fixed-capacity water supply system at
peak load times
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recovery, even though the net value of water use is maximised.
This situation occurs when average costs are above marginal costs
at the optimum price, and will in turn lead to poor service levels,
less organisational capacity and low level of sustainability of
services. Furthermore, for lower income households, water usage
will be less responsive to price changes and so the pricing signal
will be less effective (MJA, 2004; Whittington, 2003).
To overcome these limitations and reconcile the objectives of
economic pricing with full cost recovery, some utilities have used
a two-part water rate. The first component is a volumetric charge
to be paid for each unit of water consumed; this is computed
according to the water supply system’s marginal cost of providing
the services. The second component of the tariff is a periodic
fixed charge, unrelated to the metered water consumption, which
covers any revenue shortfall. The simplest way to obtain this
fixed charge is by dividing the total revenue shortfall by the
number of connections. In practice, however, the revenue shortfall
may be allocated among the utility’s categories of customers, in
line with other objectives for tariff setting such as social fairness
and universal service coverage (Barbera´n and Arbue´s, 2009).
2.3 Examples of tariff structures commonly applied for
WDM
Given the need to strike a balance between the multiple
objectives described in Section 2.1, it is not practical for water
utilities to aim for tariff structures that are perfectly economically
efficient. A reasonable goal for many water utilities is to design
and implement water tariffs that are as efficient as possible, given
the business environment. One of the ways of measuring the
economic efficiency of a tariff structure is the proportion of
customers whose last unit of consumption is priced at the long-
run marginal cost of water. In line with the objective of horizontal
and vertical equity, common practice is to assign customers into
categories that are based on demand and supply characteristics,
and then develop the tariff structure based on these categories
(Barbera´n and Arbue´s, 2009; Chesnutt et al., 1997).
As explained in Section 2.2, for a water-conserving tariff to also
achieve the important objective of cost recovery, it will certainly
have fixed periodic charges, which are unrelated to the amount of
water consumed. These charges are variously termed customer
charges, minimum charges, service charges, system development
charges or access fees. Designing a water-conserving tariff
involves balancing the need for revenue stability (which the fixed
charges can enhance) and conservation-oriented pricing (which
the variable charges can enhance). Long-term marginal costs are
usually higher than short-term (operating) costs and so, usually,
when the variable charge is set according to the long-run marginal
costs and fixed charge to the fixed costs, the utility will collect
revenues that exceed incurred costs. When the variable charges
are much higher than the fixed charges, the issue of revenue
stability crops up – when sales rise, revenues will rise more
quickly than costs, but will fall more quickly in periods of low
sales. Hence there is a need to find an optimum balance between
the fixed and variable charges of a water tariff structure (Chesnutt
et al., 1997; MJA, 2004). For utilities in developing countries
where one of the key objectives of tariff structures is enhance-
ment of social equity, it may be necessary to have stepped levels
of fixed monthly charges in favour of the poor and/or vulnerable
in society.
There are three commonly used types of variable rates for
enhancing water conservation. For reasons of simplicity, many
utilities implement uniform variable rates, by which the same unit
price applies for all categories and quantity of water use. Figure 3
shows a graphical representation of a uniform volume rate.
Uniform rates are easy to administer and conform to notions of
equity and fairness. A variation that could further enhance the
objective of social fairness and poverty alleviation is discriminat-
ing uniform rates by customer class. Although the extent to which
uniform rates are water conserving may be contested, it is
recognised that they perform better than decreasing block rate
tariff or tariffs composed of only fixed charges (Barbera´n and
Arbue´s, 2009; Chesnutt et al., 1997).
An increasing block tariff in which the applicable unit price
increases for higher use tiers (see example shown in Figure 4) is
perceived to be the most conservation-oriented price structure
(Chesnutt et al., 1997). However, economists do not recommend
charging different prices for water that has the same value, as this
promotes economic inefficiency. Furthermore, the often sought-
after main objective of promoting social equity and fairness in
developing countries may not be achieved by increasing block
tariffs in contexts where poor households do not have individual
house connections, but access water services through public
standpipes and/or group connections (Boland and Whittington,
2000). The strongest argument in favour of the increasing block
tariff structure is that it allows service providers to charge
Uniform volume rates
Quantity consumed
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e
Figure 3. Graphical representation of a uniform volume rate
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economically efficient prices to more customers than would
otherwise be possible and, at the same time, addresses revenue
sufficiency for the service provider (Chesnutt et al., 1997).
Furthermore, increasing block tariffs are more likely to differenti-
ate households that have more ‘luxurious’ water demands such as
swimming pools and flower garden irrigation.
Some utilities, mainly in temperate regions, use seasonal tariff
structures to cope with varying demand over the year. Most
seasonal tariff structures have two demand periods – the peak
period during the summer hotter/dryer period and the rest of the
year, as shown in Figure 5. The seasonal tariff structure sends out
important price signals about the cost of system expansion and
promotes efficient water use amidst increased demand and/or
water scarcity periods. The peak seasonal rates are designed to be
close to the long-run marginal cost of water. For instance, since
2010, the rates for Southern Water Company in the UK are
increased by 6% of the standard rate during June to September
and come down by 2% during the period October to April every
year. An alternative structure is to charge an increasing block
tariff during the peak demand season (Chesnutt et al., 1997).
3. Case study: Zaragoza, Spain
Zaragoza is a city located in the River Ebro basin of north-
eastern Spain. In 2008, Zaragoza’s population was 682 300. Prior
to an extended drought that lasted up to 1995, water prices set by
Zaragoza city council (AYTO), the water service provider, were
mainly guided by financial and political objectives. The tariff
structure comprised a fixed fee and a volumetric-based rate,
which generated enough revenue to cater for a politically
acceptable part of the costs of providing water services (Arbue´s
and Villanu´a, 2006). The monthly fixed fee was based on the
street category where the building was located, which mainly
depended on the length/width of the street and whether there
were any commercial enterprises. The volumetric rates were
categorised into four blocks, as shown in Table 1.
The tariff structure shown in Table 1 is progressive. For instance,
if the consumption of consumer X was 20 m3 during the month,
they would pay 527 pesetas (i.e. obtained by the addition of
(12 3 6) + (25 3 7) + (40 3 7)). However, there were quite a few
properties that did not have consumption meters, which meant
that the service provider would sometimes rely on estimated
consumption. Furthermore, as can be seen in Table 1, there was
no differentiation between domestic and non-domestic tariffs.
This tariff structure did not encourage water conservation and so
was found to be unsuitable during the extended drought period.
In 1995, in response to changes to the extended drought, AYTO
initiated a long-term programme to reform the tariff. The tariff
reform process was guided by findings of an econometric study
carried out by the University of Zaragoza between 1996 and
2004. The key findings of this study were
j responsiveness of demand to price: the average price
elasticity of demand was 0.0811
Increasing block tariff
Pr
ic
e
Quantity consumed
Figure 4. Graphical representation of an increasing block tariff
Periodic time
Off-peak
Peak
Off-peak
Seasonal rates
Pr
ic
e
Figure 5. Graphical representation of a seasonal tariff structure
Consumption:
m3 per property per month
Price: pesetas/m3a
0–6 12
.6, ,13 25
.13, ,35 40
.35 56
a The Spanish peseta was replaced by the Euro in 2002 at an
exchange rate of 166.4 pesetas to 1 A.
Table 1. Zaragoza variable tariff in 1993 (Lucea, 2010)
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j responsiveness of demand to income: the average income
elasticity of demand was 0.7919
j the average elasticity of water consumption with respect to
family size was 0.4794 (Arbue´s and Villanu´a, 2006).
Other findings were that every household required an average
basic minimum amount of 3.5 m3 per month to maintain the
common good in the home, while each resident required
additional 2.5 m3 of water per month, which decreased with
household size, along economies of scale. Hence it was con-
cluded that 18.5 m3 per household per month would meet the
average requirements of households with up to six members.
AYTO redesigned the tariff structure to make it more water
conserving, in line with the findings of the econometric study. The
new tariff structure has been in operation since 2005, and price
levels are regularly adjusted to conform to inflation rates. Table 2
presents the 2009 tariff structure for household size of up to six
people; the table shows that, whereas consumption in blocks 1 and 2
attracts some subsidies, the price levels in block 3 cover full supply
costs. This is a progressive tariff structure, similar to its predecessor.
In order for households with more than six people to benefit from
these subsidies, there is provision for them to be charged on a
special tariff rate, after their claims have been verified by the
responsible utility staff. Other categories of people that benefit from
special tariffs are the unemployed, the sick and the poor.
Furthermore, AYTO has been offering economic incentives to
households that reduce their consumption rates. If households
reduced their consumption by at least 40% in the first year of
joining the scheme, they were entitled to a 10% discount on their
bill. In subsequent years, they were expected to reduce consump-
tion by 10% per annum in order for them to benefit from a
similar price rebate. Table 3 shows the number of households that
benefited from the economic incentives from when the scheme
started, in 2002, to 2006.
Table 3 shows that some households had the capacity to
continuously make savings in subsequent years. For instance, of
the 1708 households that reduced their consumption by 40% in
2002, 375 of these made a further 10% reduction in 2003. A
further 10% saving was achieved by 66 households in 2004, two
households in 2005 and one household in 2006. As can be seen
from column 2 of the table, the scheme was embraced by an
increasing number of households, which contributed to overall
reduction in water consumption in Zaragoza in subsequent years.
The economic instruments described above complemented other
activities carried out as part of a long-term programme implemen-
ted by a partnership of key stakeholder organisations in Zaragoza
aimed at improving efficiency of urban water use in the city
(Kayaga et al., 2008). This programme, implemented between
1997 and 2008, used a combination of measures and instruments
to effect behavioural change among end-users and encourage
them to make structural changes in their fixtures and appliances,
which resulted in positive changes in water use efficiency.
Although the city’s population increased from 606 069 in 1997 to
682 283 by 2008 (an increase of over 12%), overall water
consumption reduced from 84.8 to 61.5 million m3 – a reduction
of 27% (AYTO, 2009). A survey conducted in Zaragoza showed
that the adoption of water-efficient devices made a significant
contribution to water conservation. Behavioural change, which
was largely influenced by the economic instruments (i.e. tariff
redesign and economic incentives), produced a more significant
contribution to water conservation (Edo and Soler, 2004).
4. Case study: Kampala, Uganda
Kampala, the capital city of Uganda, has an estimated popu-
lation of 1.35 million, 45% of whom live in low-income
Consumption:
m3 per household per month
Rate: A/m3 water
Water Sewerage
Block 1: ,6 0.16 0.17
Block 2: .6, ,18.5 0.39 0.41
Block 3: .18.5 0.78 0.82
Table 2. Typical 2009 Zaragoza variable water tariff (Lucea, 2010)
Start year Households
with new
commitment
Further subsequent savings of 10% in the year
2003 2004 2005 2006
2002 1708 375 66 2 1
2003 27 741 5331 487 123
2004 24 331 2956 721
2005 27 929 4635
2006 33 274
Table 3. Number of households benefiting from economic
incentives (Lucea, 2010)
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informal settlements (BCA, 2004). The water and sewerage
services in Kampala and 21 other major urban areas in the
country are provided by the National Water and Sewerage
Corporation (NWSC), a corporate public-owned utility. The
level and quality of water in Lake Victoria, from which
NWSC draws its supplies for Kampala and a few other major
towns, have deteriorated in the past few years, mainly due to
the effects of climate change and rapid urbanisation respec-
tively. This has necessitated continuous infrastructure invest-
ment.
The objective of this study was to investigate how water-
conserving tariffs could be used as an economic instrument to
encourage current household consumers to conserve water in
their premises and hence reduce the pressure placed on the
infrastructure and water resources in Kampala. This study used
billing data and basic socio-economic data for Kampala to
develop a Microsoft Excel based model for optimising a water-
conserving tariff structure while also aiming to achieve appro-
priate cross-subsidies between income groups in a socially
equitable manner. Monthly household billing datasets were
obtained for 71 851 households for the period July 2006 to June
2007, which, after processing, produced 54 024 useable datasets.
These were arranged in hierarchical order based on customer
reference numbers, and a 5% random sample was drawn, yielding
2701 households.
The following socio-economic attributes for Kampala were
adopted from previous studies.
j Average household size of five, obtained from the Uganda
national household survey 2005/2006 (UBOS, 2006).
j Per capita water consumption estimates for three income
categories (high, medium and low) obtained from a
consultancy study by Beller Consult and Associates (BCA,
2004).
j Estimated (2004) income ranges for customers of NWSC in
Kampala obtained from a study on water service connection
charges and costs (Kayaga and Franceys, 2007) and adjusted
by Uganda’s national economic growth rate of 6%.
Data on price elasticity of demand for Kampala could not be found
and so, through parallel surveying, the city of Cape Town was
identified as the closest match. Estimated figures for price elasticity
were reported in a study by Jansen and Schulz (2006) and these
matched with data obtained from Kampala, as shown in Table 4.
The following key assumptions were taken into consideration.
j Each household uses its own water service connection, with
no sharing between households.
j Average household size is the same across income categories
in Uganda’s urban areas (i.e. five people per household).
j Domestic water use patterns remain the same over the
modelling period.
j Annual price adjustments of 6%, indexed to inflation rates,
have negligible effect on demand for water.
j Affordability to pay for water services conforms to the World
Bank’s rule of thumb of not more than 3% of household
income (Komives et al., 2005).
The model, which optimised price levels for different income
groups according to the affordability criteria (above), was based
on the following equation for price elasticity of demand (Ed)
Q2 ¼ [1þ (P2=P1  1)Ed]Q1
in which Q1 is the initial quantity of water consumed when the
price is P1 and Q2 is the adjusted quantity consumed when the
price is changed to P2: At the time of the study, NWSC charged a
uniform rate of 1213 Uganda shillings (UGX) per cubic metre for
all household consumption (i.e. P1 ¼ 1213 for all three cate-
gories).
Table 5 shows key changes in consumption patterns that would be
imposed by the new increasing block tariff provided by the model.
If households spend 3% of their income on water services, then
the increasing block tariff structure will have three blocks, in line
with the three income categories, and the price levels will change
as shown in row 3 of Table 5. The price for block 1 will reduce by
Income
category
Estimated
income:
000 UGX a
Average per
capita
consumption:
l
Monthly
household
consumption:
m3
Estimated price
elasticity of
demand
High .1403 144 .22 0.23
Middle 503–1403 100 11–22 0.32
Low ,503 40 ,11 0.99
a 2500 UGX ¼ 1 US$.
Table 4. Model inputs derived from recent studies in Kampala and
Cape Town (Motoma, 2007)
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2%, while prices for those in blocks 2 and 3 will increase by 13%
and 58% respectively. As a result, about 8% of households will
reduce their water consumption and migrate from block 3 to block
2. Block 1 will remain almost constant, at about 29%. The
movements between consumption blocks will thus result in water
savings. Row 5 of the table shows that, whereas per capita
consumption rates for block 3 would reduce by 21% as a result of
the price increase, per capita consumption rates in blocks 1 and 2
would not change significantly.
This tariff structure would enhance allocative efficiency, given
that water consumed by the high-income group would reduce
from 55% to 38%. Furthermore, use of this tariff structure would
result in overall water savings worth 2 535 074 m3 while increas-
ing revenue collection for the service provider by 1.7 billion
UGX (US$ 0.68 million) per year. The savings made could be
utilised to expand services to low-income unplanned settlements
in Kampala, where most households are not directly connected to
the city’s water reticulation network, partly due to inadequate
water in the supply system. Densification of connections in low-
income settlements, removing ‘barriers to entry’ in the connection
process and recognising group connections would reduce the
negative effect of an increasing block tariff to the urban poor
(Kayaga and Franceys, 2007).
5. Conclusions
Water demand management strategies could be used in the short
term to plug supply–demand deficits currently existing in many
cities of developing countries and promote sustainable urban
water management in the city of the future. Economic instru-
ments, particularly tariff structures, when appropriately designed,
have the potential of encouraging water conservation in house-
holds. However, there will always be trade-offs between achieving
economic efficiency and other important objectives such as
revenue adequacy for the service provider and affordability for
low-income households.
This paper has described an increasing block tariff structure
adopted after an extended drought in Zaragoza, Spain, which
contributed to significant water conservation in households.
Applying similar econometric principles, a tariff structure was
modelled for Kampala, Uganda, which is shown to not only
conserve water, but also to increase revenue and improve
allocation efficiency of water between various income groups.
The effectiveness of the tariff would depend strongly on the
validity and reliability of the socio-economic data used to design
the tariff. This paper demonstrates that WDM concepts, which
have increasingly gained prominence in some developed coun-
tries, can be adapted to provide benefits in low-income countries.
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